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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1986, fourteen million people in the United States filed law-
suits, the cost of which has been estimated to be between thirty and
thirty-seven billion dollars.' In addition, the dollar amounts awarded
to successful plaintiffs are reported to have increased at a rate that
far surpasses the rate of inflation. 2 Consequently, a troublesome
inflation of liability insurance costs has resulted from which it ap-
pears no segment of our society is immune.' However, the increase
in liability insurance rates has accelerated most rapidly in the medical
field.4
The Secretary of Health and Human Services for the Reagan
administration, Mr. Otis Bowen, released a government study on
malpractice which disclosed that insurance premiums for the average
1. Zuckerman, Tort Reform, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Sept. 7, 1987, at 68.
2. Willard, The Time Has Come For Tort Reform, U.S.A. TODAY, March 1987, at 48.
3. Nonprofit organizations, professionals, businesses and state and local governments across
the nation are reported to be paying extravagantly higher insurance premiums. Id.
4. P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1985).
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physician had increased 81% from 1982 to 1985.1 However, for ob-
stetrics and gynecology, the hardest-hit specialty, insurance prem-
iums increased 113%6 As a result, many doctors have shunned
procedures that are affiliated with malpractice suits, while others
have left the medical profession entirely. 7
Swayed by escalating liability insurance premiums, numerous
states have enacted legislation that alters the traditional common
law tort system's approach to personal injuries.' State legislative
responses have included: limiting the award of damages, eliminating
joint and several liability, providing for periodic payments of future
economic damages, scheduling contingency fees, and deducting col-
lateral sources of compensation received for the same injury.9 One
of the most prominent issues in the area is the constitutionality of
enactments that limit or cap damages in tort cases, particularly in
medical malpractice cases.' 0
Numerous states, including West Virginia," have passed legis-
lation which has placed some type of cap on medical malpractice
awards.12 Constitutional challenges to this type of legislation have
met with mixed judicial responses for a variety of reasons. One
reason for the lack of a consensus among state courts is that the
statutes themselves vary considerably. 3 They differ as to the types
of damages that are limited and as to the monetary limits that are
placed on awards as well. Additionally, the differences among state
court decisions have resulted both from diverse judicial views re-
garding fundamental constitutional protections and from the pres-
ence of provisions that are unique to certain state constitutions. 4
5. Zuckerman, supra note 1, at 68.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Smith, Medicine and Law: Aids, Constitutional Challenges to Tort Reform and Medical
Malpractice, 23 TORT & INS. L. J. 370 (1988).
9. Freeman, Tort Law Reform: Superfund/RCRA Liability as a Major Cause of the Insurance
Crisis, 21 TORT & INS. L. J. 517 (1986).
10. Smith, supra note 8, at 387.
11. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1988).
12. Tort Reform Developments, INs. LiTIGATION REP., June 1987, at 158 (survey of statutory
damage limits for malpractice actions).
13. Id. at 159, 160.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 108-168.
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Statutory caps on damages raise several significant constitutional
issues. Similarly, decisions in this area reveal various theories of
constitutional challenge. This note examines a number of the con-
stitutional challenges that have been asserted, as well as the possible
applicability of these challenges to chapter 55, article 7B, section 8
of the West Virginia Code [hereinafter W. Va. Code] § 55-7B-8.
This statute limits liability for noneconomic loss in medical mal-
practice liability actions. 15
A. The Equal Protection Challenge
Statutes which place limitations on medical malpractice damages
have been scrutinized by courts by means of equal protection chal-
lenges. 16 The equal protection clause, which guarantees that similar
people will be treated in a similar manner and that people of dif-
ferent circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same, 17
has become the "single most important concept in the Constitution
for the protection of individual rights." 18
Equal protection guarantees that a law does not unconstitution-
ally discriminate between classifications of persons.' 9 Those who
challenge the medical malpractice caps under equal protection anal-
ysis contend that the caps favor a particular class in some way. First,
it is contended that the statutes which cap damages in medical mal-
practice cases distinguish between medical malpractice tort victims
and tort victims in general. 20 Plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions
are entitled only to limited recovery while plaintiffs in other actions
may receive complete compensation for their injuries. 2' Second, it
is asserted that the statutes differentiate between those medical mal-
practice tort victims whose damages are less than the statutory mon-
etary limit, who may enjoy full recovery, and those whose damages
surpass the limit, who are not entitled to full recovery. 22
15. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1988).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 17-91.
17. J. NowA ,, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CoNsTrruTioNAL LAw 587 (2d ed.1983).
18. Id. at 585.
19. Id.
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Initially, when faced with an equal protection challenge to sta-
tutes which set caps on medical malpractice damages, the courts
must determine which standard of review to apply. Ultimately,
whether a classification can be determined to meet the equal pro-
tection guarantee under one of the three levels of review depends
upon 1) the purpose which one imputes to the legislative act and
2) the ascertainment of whether there is a sufficient degree of re-
lationship between the asserted governmental end and the classifi-
cation.2Y
There appears to be a consensus among courts that medical mal-
practice damage limits should not be subject to the strict scrutiny
level of review.24 Under this standard, courts will not accept every
permissible government purpose as sufficient to justify a classifi-
cation, but will require the government to show that it is pursuing
a "compelling" or "overriding" end.25 Courts apply this strict stan-
dard of review when a statute creates a suspect classification or
burdens a fundamental right.26
Suspect classifications which have triggered the application of
the strict scrutiny standard include race, 27 national origin,28 and al-
ienage. 29 It is clear that tort victims are not a suspect classA0
Furthermore, courts have looked to Munn v. Illinois3' for guid-
ance, in which the United States Supreme Court stated that persons
have no property or vested interest in any rule of the common law.32
As a result, those courts have reasoned that individuals cannot claim
full recovery in tort as a fundamental right.33 Therefore, because
statutes which cap damages in medical malpractice cases neither cre-
ate a suspect classification nor infringe upon a fundamental right,
23. Nowak, supra note 17, at 590.
24. See, e.g., Boyd, 547 F. Supp. at 786, 787.
25. Id. at 792.
26. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
27. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
29. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
30. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
31. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
32. Id. at 134.
33. E.g., Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 787.
[Vol. 91
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they have not been subjected to strict standards of judicial review.
However, the courts that have ruled on this issue and determined
that strict scrutiny is an inappropriate level of review do not agree
on whether to apply the rational basis test or some type of inter-
mediate standard of review.3 4
When the rational basis test is applied, courts inquire whether
it is plausible that the classification bears a rational relationship to
an end of government which is not prohibited by the United States
Constitution. 5 As long as the legislature arguably had such a basis
for creating the classification, the law will not be invalidated on
equal protection grounds. 6 It is important to note that this standard
is generally applied to social and economic regulations.3 7
The courts which have applied the rational basis level of scrutiny
to caps on medical malpractice damages generally have found that
the statutes do not violate equal protection principles. 8 In Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group,3 9 the plaintiff, an attorney who sued
a partnership of physicians for failing to diagnose his impending
heart attack, challenged the constitutionality of a California statute
capping noneconomic damages.4° The California Supreme Court ap-
plied the rational basis standard of review and held that the cap of
$250,000 on the recovery of noneconomic damages was rationally
related to the legitimate goal of reducing insurance costs. 41
In Fein, the plaintiff alleged that the statutory cap violated equal
protection because it discriminated between medical malpractice vic-
34. The courts in Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978), Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hasp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) and Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d
825 (1980), applied intermediate level scrutiny. The courts in Fein v. Permanente Medical Groups,
38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985),
Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985), Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center,
3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976), Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984), Waggoner, 647 F. Supp. 1102 and Boyd, 647 F. Supp. 781, applied the rational basis test.
35. NoWiAK, supra note 17, at 591.
36. Id.
37. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 39-51.
39. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 358.
40. Id. at 142, 595 P.2d at 669, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
41. Id. at 158, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
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tims and other tort victims. Likewise, he alleged that it discriminated
within the class of medical malpractice victims by denying a "com-
plete" recovery of damages to only those malpractice plaintiffs with
noneconomic damages exceeding $250,000.42 The court disposed of
the first contention and held that the statute was rationally related
to its legislative purpose, which was a response to the insurance
"crisis" in the medical malpractice area.43
Additionally, the Fein court offered plausible justifications which
the legislature might have had for enacting a statute which limits
noneconomic damages only in medical malpractice cases. First, the
court acknowledged that the wide disparity in large noneconomic
jury awards may be reduced.44 Next, the court stated that an across-
the-board limitation may provide a more stable base on which to
calculate insurance rates .4 Third, the court reasoned that a $250,000
limit may promote settlements by eliminating the unknown possi-
bility of phenomenal awards for pain and suffering.46 Finally, the
court concluded that it may be fairer to malpractice plaintiffs in
general to only decrease the large noneconomic damage awards.4 1
Likewise, the plaintiff's claim that the statute violated equal pro-
tection because of its differential effect within the class of mal-
practice plaintiffs was found to be without merit.48 The Fein court
reasoned that the intended cost savings obtained by limiting the re-
covery of noneconomic damages provided a reasonable basis for
drawing a distinction between economic and noneconomic dam-
ages. 49 Furthermore, the court found that a limitation on economic
damages was not mandated by the equal protection clause simply
because limitations were imposed on damages for noneconomic
losses.5 0 Thus, based upon the given reasoning, the plaintiff's equal
protection challenge to the capping statute failed.
42. Id. at 161, 162, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
43. Id.
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Similarly, in Boyd v. Bulala,5' a federal district court applied the
rational basis test when it was faced with an equal protection chal-
lenge to a Virginia statute which limited total medical malpractice
damages to one million dollars.52 The district court examined equal
protection issues under both the state and federal constitutions. It
noted that, although the Virginia Constitution contains no equal
protection clause, equal protection rights are guaranteed by the do-
cument's anti-discriminatory clause 3 and the prohibitions against
special legislation.5 4
The court found that the Virginia medical malpractice cap leg-
islation clearly did not create a suspect classification,55 but noted
that it would be subject to strict scrutiny if it infringed upon a
fundamental right. 56 However, following the reasoning of Munn,57
the court held that the right to a full recovery in tort is not a fun-
damental right under the Virginia Constitution.58 Therefore, since
the capping statute neither created a suspect classification nor in-
fringed upon a fundamental right, the court scrutinized the provision
under the rational basis test, which is generally applied when re-
viewing economic regulations.A9 The court found that the cap was
a rational means to achieve the legislative goal of securing the con-
tinuation of health care services by maintaining the availability of
malpractice insurance at affordable rates. 60 Thus, the statute was
found to meet the requirements of the state antidiscriminatory clause
and the clause against special legislation prohibitions which guar-
antee equal protection. 61
An additional level of review that has been applied by courts
when examining statutes under an equal protection challenge is the
51. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 787.
52. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
53. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
54. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14.
55. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 786.
56. Id. at 787.
57. Munn, 94 U.S. at 134.
58. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 787.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 788.
19891
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intermediate level of review. The United States Supreme Court has
applied this level of judicial scrutiny to analyze discriminatory state
actions based on gender62 and illegitimacy.63 To meet this level of
review, a classification must be "substantially related" to an "im-
portant governmental objective." 64 While this test has not been ex-
tended to liability cap challenges by the United States Supreme Court,
various state courts have applied it to medical malpractice statutes
which limit the amount of damages recoverable.6
In Arneson v. Olson,66 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that a statute67 which capped total damages of medical malpractice
claims at $300,000 violated the state and federal guarantee of equal
protection.68 The court applied a standard of review which was more
rigorous than the rational basis test but less demanding than the
strict scrutiny test. 69 It stated that this intermediate level of review
required "a, close correspondence between statutory classification
and legislative goals.' '70 The court utilized this particular test because
it was the test employed in a similar case involving the constitu-
tionality of the state's automobile guest statute, which limited re-
covery in tort for passengers in automobiles. 7'
The Arneson court's application of this test resulted in a finding
that the statute violated the equal protection provisions of the North
Dakota Constitution 72 and the United States Constitution.7" In its
analysis, the court examined the legislative goals behind the enact-
ment and found that the cap was unsuccessful in fulfilling those
goals. 74 The statute did not provide adequate compensation to pa-
62. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
63. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1979).
64. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
65. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. 781.
66. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
67. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-11 (RepI. Vol. 1978).
68. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 136.
69. Id. at 133.
70. Id. (citing Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 775 (N.D. 1974), a case involving the
constitutionality of an automobile guest statute).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 135.
73. Id. at 136.
74. Id. at 135.
[Vol. 91
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tients with meritorious claims, 75 nor did it aid in the elimination of
nonmeritorious claims. 76 The court noted that, although caps on
recovery may encourage physicians to practice in the state, such
measures did so "at the expense of claimants with meritorious
claims." 77 In addition, the Arneson court stated that the trial court's
finding that there was no insurance crisis in North Dakota was not
clearly erroneous.78
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Carson v.
Maurer,79 applied an intermediate level of judicial review in response
to an equal protection challenge of an enactment which limited non-
economic damages in medical malpractice claims to $250,000.80 While
noting that the medical malpractice statute established several clas-
sifications, the Carson court held that the statute did not involve
a suspect classification, nor did it impinge upon a fundamental right.81
Thus, the court found that the application of strict judicial scrutiny
would be inappropriate.8 2 However, the court held that the right to
recover for personal injuries was an important substantive right83
and that any restriction imposed upon that right must be subjected
to more rigorous judicial scrutiny than permitted under the rational
basis test.8 4 While recognizing that the United States Supreme Court
had limited its application of this judicial test to cases involving
classifications based upon gender and illegitimacy, 85 the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court noted that it is not confined to federal con-
stitutional standards but, rather, that it is free to grant individuals
more rights than the Federal Constitution requires. 86
Applying a "fair and substantial relation" test, the New Hamp-





79. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
80. N.H. Rav. STAT. § 507-C:7 (RepI. Vol. 1983).
81. Carson, 120 N.H. at 931, 424 A.2d at 830.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 931, 932, 424 A.2d at 830.
84. Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830.




Oliverio: To Cap or Not to Cap Damage Awards: That is the Constitutional Qu
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
age limitation unconstitutionally denied equal protection to medical
malpractice plaintiffs. 87 The necessary relationship between the leg-
islative goal of reducing malpractice premiums and the statutory cap
as the means chosen to attain that goal was found by the Carson
court as tenuous for two reasons. First, the court stated that "paid-
out damage awards constitute only a small part of total insurance
premium costs." 88 Next, and more importantly, the court stated that
"few individuals suffer noneconomic damages in excess of
$250,000."89 Additionally, the Carson court agreed with the North
Dakota Supreme Court in its analysis in Arneson, stating that such
a statute neither provided adequate compensation to plaintiffs with
meritorious claims, nor deterred nonmeritorious claims. 90 The court
further stated that a tort victim gains nothing from an economic
loss award and that only an award above the plaintiff's out-of-
pocket loss compensates for the "pain, suffering, physical impair-
ment or disfigurement that the victim must endure until death." 9'
Thus, it is clear that the courts disagree on the proper standard
of review to be applied to capping statutes under equal protection
challenges. The success of such challenges appears to depend to a
great extent upon the level of judicial review that a court may deem
appropriate for application in the particular case before it.
B. The Due Process Challenge
When examining statutes which limit damages recoverable in
medical malpractice cases under a due process analysis, courts have
generally adopted the deferential approach which the United States
Supreme Court has employed with regard to economic regulation.92
The Supreme Court has almost totally abandoned any real scrutiny
of economic legislation under substantive due process analysis.93
Rather, the Court has opted to employ the rational basis test when
87. Id. at 943, 424 A.2d at 838.
88. Id. at 941, 424 A.2d at 835.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 941, 424 A.2d at 837.
91. Id. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837.
92. See, e.g., Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 787.
93. NowAK, supra note 17, at 448.
[Vol. 91
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reviewing the substance of laws and regulations challenged under
the guarantee of due process when the regulation does not involve
a fundamental constitutional right, suspect classification, or the
characteristics of citizenship, gender or illegitimacy. 94
For instance, in Boyd v. Bulala,95 the district court held that,
although the challenged capping statute violated the constitutional
guarantee of right to a civil jury trial, it did not violate constitutional
due process guarantees. 96 Because the statute neither infringed upon
a fundamental right, nor created a suspect class, it was subjected
to the liberal standard of review normally applied to economic re-
gulations under due process analysis. 97 The statute was found to meet
the requirements of the due process clause because it was a "rational
means to achieve the legislative goal of securing the provision of
health care services by maintaining the availability of malpractice
insurance at affordable rates." 98
Several courts, however, have taken their due process analysis
of capping statutes beyond the test of whether the statute is ra-
tionally related to legitimate state interests and have analyzed the
statutes under the due process theory of quid pro quo.99 The four-
teenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ."100
Thus, under the quid pro quo theory, legislation which takes away
a party's common law right to recovery in tort, which is deemed
to be a property right, is unconstitutional if it fails to grant a re-
ciprocal right or benefit to such party. 10
As justification for such a requirement of a reciprocal right or
benefit in cases involving the constitutionality of statutory caps on
damages, societal quid pro quo arguments have been made. These
94. Id. at 449.
95. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. 781.
96. Id. at 787.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. The idea that due process imposes a quidpro quo requirement seems to have resulted from
dictum in New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
101. See, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 406 (1976).
19891
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arguments reason that "the loss of recovery potential to some mal-
practice victims is offset by lower malpractice insurance premiums
and lower medical care costs for all recipients of medical care."' 0 2
However, such arguments have been rejected by a number of courts,
which have reasoned that lower medical costs for all health care
recipients do not adequately compensate the severely injured mal-
practice plaintiff. 103
The North Dakota Supreme Court held in Arneson'°4 that the
limitation of recovery did not provide adequate compensation to
patients with meritorious claims; rather, it harmfully impeded the
rights of the most seriously injured claimants. 05 Likewise, while
finding a lack of quid pro quo for potential medical malpractice
victims, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reasoned in Carson0 6
that it was "unreasonable and unfair to impose the burden of sup-
porting the medical care industry solely upon those persons who are
most severely injured and therefore most in need of compensa-
tion. "107 The court reasoned further that the limitation on medical
malpractice damages lacks the quid pro quo provided by worker's
compensation statutes. 08
Similarly, in Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas v. Baber,0 9 no
quid pro quo was found. However, the state's medical malpractice
cap was found unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 10 The
Baber court noted that, although the absence of a quid pro quo
does not mandate a finding of unconstitutionality, its presence would
strengthen the statute's validity."'
In contrast, the California Supreme Court stated in Fein"2 that
"even if due process principles required some 'quid pro quo' to
102. See, e.g., Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Assoc., 63 Il1. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
103. See infra text accompanying notes 104-111.
104. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d 125.
105. Id. at 135.
106. Carson, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825.
107. Id. at 942, 424 A.2d at 837.
108. Id. at 943, 424 A.2d at 837.
109. Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
110. Id. at 298.
111. Id.
112. Fein, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368.
[Vol. 91
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support the statute, it would be difficult to say that the preservation
of a viable medical insurance industry in California was not an ad-
equate benefit for the detriment the legislation imposes on mal-
practice plaintiffs."'' 13 Accordingly, the Fein court rejected the due
process challenge, holding that the statutory cap was rationally re-
lated to the objective of reducing the liability of malpractice de-
fendants and their insurers. 14
The plaintiff in Fein appealed from the judgment that the stat-
utory cap was constitutional.1 5 The Supreme Court of the United
States refused to hear the case on the ground that it did not present
a substantial federal question."16 The denial of certiorari, however,
contained a noteworthy dissent' 17 written by Justice White which
addressed a question left unresolved by the Supreme Court in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group.1' 8 The question,
which Justice White claims is dividing the appellate and highest courts
of several states, is "[w]hether due process requires a legislatively
enacted compensation scheme to be a quid pro quo for the common
law or state law remedy it replaces, and if so, [how adequate must
it be?]"' 1 9 Justice White noted that the unresolved status of this
question is one of the reasons for the division among the state courts
concerning the constitutionality of damage caps. 20 Thus, until the
United States Supreme Court rules on this issue, the inconsistency
among state court decisions is likely to continue.
C. The Right Of Access To The Courts Challenge
An additional constitutional challenge to statutory caps which is
based upon state constitutional grounds is premised upon guarantees
of a certain remedy or right of access to the courts. Thirty-seven
state constitutions contain provisions which generally provide that
113. Id. at 160 n.18, 695 P.2d at 681-82 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.18.
114. Id. at 159, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
115. Fein, 474 U.S. 892.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
119. Fein, 474 U.S. at 894, 895.
120. Id. at 894.
19891
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the courts "shall be open to every person, and a speedy and certain
remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person,
property or reputation." 121
In Smith v. Department of Insurance,22 the Florida Supreme
Court ruled on the constitutionality of the Florida Tort Reform and
Insurance Act. One section of the Act placed a $450,000 cap on
damages which tort victims could recover for noneconomic losses.12 1
The Smith court held that the particular provision of the Act which
was at issue violated the victim's constitutional right to access to
the courts, which is guaranteed by the Florida constitution. 24 The
court followed the reasoning of an earlier case, Kluger v. White, 25
in which it held that the legislature could not restrict a plaintiff's
right of access to the courts by establishing a minimum amount
below which the injured plaintiff could not sue. 126 The Smith court
stated that there was no relevant distinction between the issue that
Smith presented and the issue addressed in Kluger127 Furthermore,
the court found that the statutory cap was not based on a legislative
showing of "an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment
of such right" and that a reasonable alternative remedy or com-
mensurate benefit was not provided. 128
Additionally, the Smith court addressed the argument that the
legislature had not denied tort victims the right to access to the
courts because it had not totally abolished a cause of action, but
had merely placed a limitation on damages which may be recov-
ered. 29 The court found this argument unconvincing, reasoning that
the access to the courts provision must be read in conjunction with
the right to trial by jury provision of the state constitution.
Access to the courts is granted for the purpose of redressing injuries. A plaintiff
who receives a jury verdict for e.g., $1,000,000 has not received a constitutional
121. Smith, supra note 8, at 396.
122. Smith v. Dept. of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
123. FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (1986).
124. Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1087; FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 21.
125. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d I (Fla. 1973).
126. Id.
127. Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1088.
128. Id. (citing Kluger, 281 So. 2d 1).
129. Id. at 1088, 1089.
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redress of injuries if the legislature statutorily and arbitrarily, caps the recovery
at $450,000. Nor, we add, because the jury verdict is being arbitrarily capped,
is the plaintiff receiving the constitutional benefit of a jury trial as we have here-
tofore understood that right. Further, if the legislature may constitutionally cap
recovery at $450,000 there is no discernible reason why it could not cap the
recovery at some other figure, perhaps $50,000, or $1,000, or even $1. None of
these caps, under the reasoning of appellees, would "totally" abolish the right
to access to the courts. 30
Following similar reasoning, the Texas Supreme Court in Lucas
v. United States,' recently responded to a certified question posed
by the Fifth Circuit 132 concerning the constitutionality of a state stat-
utory limitation on medical malpractice damages. 33 The court held
that the statute, which limited damages to $500,000 exclusive of
medical expenses, violated the open courts provision'3 4 of the state
constitution.1 35
Construing the open courts provision, the Lucas court stated that
a litigant must satisfy two criteria in order to succeed in a right to
redress challenge. 36 "First, it must be shown that the litigant has
a cognizable common law cause of action that is being restricted.
Second, the litigant must show that the restriction is unreasonable
or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the
statute.' '1 37 Finding the first criteria satisfied, the court stated that
it has long been recognized by Texas courts that medical negligence
victims have a "well-defined common law cause of action to sue
for injuries negligently inflicted upon them.' ' 3 The court indicated
that the restriction posed by the cap was unreasonable and arbitrary 3 9
by stating that:
In the context of persons catastrophically injured by medical negligence, we believe
it is unreasonable and arbitrary to limit their recovery in a speculative experiment
130. Id.
131. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
132. The Texas Supreme Court's authority to answer questions of state law certified by federal
appellate courts is of recent origin. Texas voters approved an amendment to the Texas Constitution
in 1985, which became TEx. CONsT. art. V, § 3-C.
133. TEx. REV. Cwv. STAr. art. 4590, §§ 11.02, 11.03 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
134. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13.
135. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 692.
136. Id. at 690.
137. Id. (citing Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1983)).
138. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 690.
139. Id.
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to determine whether liability insurance rates will decrease. Texas Constitution
article I, section 13, guarantees meaningful access to the courts whether or not
liability rates are high.'14
One of the Lucas court's concerns was that no adequate sub-
stitute was provided by the legislature to enable an injured plaintiff
to obtain redress for injuries. 41 Thus, following the reasoning of
the Illinois case, Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Assoc. ,142 the
court rejected the societal quid pro quo argument. The Lucas court
recognized that limiting recovery solely in malpractice actions was
held by Wright to be arbitrary. Such arbitrariness is part of the two-
factor test which is applied by the Texas courts. 143
While noting the legislature's concern in trying to solve the health
care problems it perceived in the mid-1970's, 144 the Texas Supreme
Court in Lucas agreed with the Carson court that it is neither fair,
nor reasonable "to impose the burden of supporting the medical
care industry solely upon those persons who are most severely in-
jured and therefore most in need of compensation."'' 4
Thus, as demonstrated in Smith and Lucas, provisions in state
constitutions which guarantee a right of access to the courts or a
certainty of remedy for injury to person, property, or reputation,
may provide grounds for a successful state constitutional challenge
against damage limitation enactments.
D. The Right To Trial By Jury Challenge
Statutes which limit the dollar amount of damages that are re-
coverable by plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions may face the
possibility of being declared unconstitutional because they violate
the right to a trial by jury. One's right to a trial by jury in a federal
civil trial is guaranteed by the seventh amendment to the United
States Constitution. 46 However, the United States Supreme Court
140. Id. at 691.
141. Id. at 690.
142. Wright, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736.
143. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 691.
144. Id. at 692.
145. Id. (quoting Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 941, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (1980)).
146. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII.
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has held that this constitutional right does not apply to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.147 Therefore, in a state court the
constitutional right to a jury in a civil case must arise from the state
constitution.
Both the state of Virginia's constitution and the federal consti-
tutional right to trial by jury were analyzed in Boyd v. Bulala,148 a
federal diversity suit applying Virginia law. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Virginia held that Virginia's
medical malpractice cap 49 which limited recovery in medical mal-
practice actions violated both the state and federal constitutional
rights to trial by jury. 50
First, the Boyd court noted that in federal diversity cases, the
federal right to a jury prevails.' 5' Additionally, the court stated that
the seventh amendment provides the right to 1) a jury determination
of liability and 2) a jury determination of the extent of the injury
by an assessment of damages. 52 Thus, the capping statute at issue
was found to constitute an infringement of the fact-finding function
of the jury in assessing damages. 153 A limitation of the performance
of that function is a limitation on the jury's role and, since the
seventh amendment guarantees the right to a jury as the fact-finder,
such a limitation was held unconstitutional. 54
The Boyd court further noted that while it had the power to set
aside a verdict and order a new trial, a remittitur, or a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, it could exercise these powers only when
there is a discrepancy between the evidence and the verdict. 155 The
capping statute, however, required that the court enter a judgment
for the capped amount when a verdict in the amount above the cap
was supported by evidence. 156 Thus, the court found that the capping
147. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
148. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. 781, 672 F. Supp. 915.
149. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
150. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 789.
151. Id. at 788.
152. Id.
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statute was in no way related to the procedures of remittitur, new
trial, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 157
Additionally, the Boyd court found that the right to a civil jury
provided by the Virginia constitution is equivalent to the federal
seventh amendment right. 58 In Virginia, "it is the province of the
jury to settle questions of fact and this includes the question of
damages.' 59 Thus, it was held that the statute not only unconsti-
tutionally violated the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the federal
constitution, but it likewise unconstitutionally violated the similar
provision of the Virginia constitution.' 60
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court, in Kansas Malpractice Vic-
tims Coalition v. Bell,'6' held that a state statute'62 setting a cap on
the amount of recovery in medical malpractice actions and requiring
annuities for payments of future economic loss unconstitutionally
violated the right to trial by jury.' 63 The statute in question limited
noneconomic damages to $250,000 and total damages (including no-
neconomic and economic damages) to $1,000,000. In addition, any
recovery for future loss was required to be invested in an annuity
with regular payments to the plaintiff over a number of years. 1' 4
The state constitution of Kansas provides that "the right of trial
by jury shall be inviolate.' 165 Although the Kansas Supreme Court
has held that a jury trial is only guaranteed in cases where the right
existed at common law,166 the right to trial by jury was found ap-
plicable here because "[c]ommon law allows for the recovery of
damages for negligent injury."' 6 7
The Bell court found that the traditional role of the jury is to





161. Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988).
162. KAN. STAT. §§ 60-3407 (Supp. 1987).
163. Bell, 757 P.2d at 260.
164. Id. at 255.
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ages is an issue of fact, the court held that it is the responsibility
of the jury to determine the damages. 168 By setting a limit on the
recovery of damages, it was found that the statute restricted before
trial the amount of damages available to those victims who are most
severely injured. 69 Additionally, the court determined that access to
the recovery that is received is also restricted by the annuity
requirement1 70 and stated:
In other words, for a plaintiff who sustains massive injuries and to whom a jury
awards $4,000,000, H.B. 2661 makes the determination that $1,000,000 is all the
plaintiff needs. For a plaintiff who suffers any extreme pain and disfigurement,
a limit of $250,000 is imposed. When the trial judge enters judgment for less
than the jury verdict (as H.B. 2661 directs him to do) and orders an annuity
contract, he clearly invades the province of the jury. This is an infringement on
the jury's determination of the facts, and thus, is an infringement on the right
to a jury trial.' 7'
Furthermore, while recognizing the fact that the legislature has
the power to modify the right to a jury trial through its power to
change the common law, 7 2 the Bell court noted that any statutory
modification must satisfy due process requirements and be "rea-
sonably necessary in the public interest to promote the general wel-
fare of the people of the state.'17  The court stated that one way
to meet due process requirements was by quid pro quo, but it found
that no adequate substitute remedy was made available to the injured
plaintiffs by the legislature. 174
The Bell court further stated that the statute was actually a pre-
established, compulsory remittitur which forced a successful plaintiff
to forego part of his jury award without his consent. 75 This con-
tradicted the general rule that remittitur of damages for personal






173. Id. at 259.
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court and even then only if the plaintiff has the option of accepting
the remittitur or asking for a new trial. 76
Thus, injured plaintiffs suing for damages as a result of medical
malpractice in a state which caps damage awards may pursue a chal-
lenge based upon the state's constitutional guarantee of a right to
a trial by jury. Whether or not such a challenge will be successful
depends upon the judicial interpretation of the particular state con-
stitutional provision.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN WEST VIRGINIA
Responding to a dramatic rise in the cost of medical malpractice
insurance coverage and the diminished extent of that coverage,'7 7 the
West Virginia Legislature passed the Medical Professional Liability
Act'7 8 in 1986.179 One of the provisions of the Act limits the amount
recoverable as damages for noneconomic loss in medical malpractice
actions to $1,000,000.18 ° Noneconomic loss is defined by the Act as
"losses, including but not limited to, pain, suffering, mental anguish
and grief."""1 While the West Virginia Supreme Court has not had
occasion to rule on the constitutionality of the provision, this Note
will discuss the possible constitutional challenges to the provision.
A. Equal Protection And Due Process Challenges In West
Virginia
West Virginia Code § 55-7B-8 may be challenged under equal
protection guarantees based upon the fact that the provision dis-
tinguishes between tort claimants whose injuries were caused by
medical malpractice and other tort claimants. 82 Furthermore, the
176. Id.
177. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-1 (Supp. 1988).
178. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-1 to -11. (Supp. 1988).
179. In the same year, the West Virginia Legislature also enacted the Government Tort Claims
and Insurance Reform Act, W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-1 to -18 (1986 Repl. Vol.), following findings
that the political subdivisions of West Virginia were unable to procure adequate liability insurance
coverage at a reasonable cost. W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-7(b) caps noneconomic loss at $500,000 in any
civil action involving a political subdivision or any of its employees as a party defendant. Id.
180. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1988).
181. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-2(g) (Supp. 1988).
182. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1988).
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provision distinguishes between medical malpractice victims whose
noneconomic loss exceeds $1,000,000 and those whose noneconomic
loss is $1,000,000 or less.'83
The West Virginia Constitution does not contain an equal pro-
tection clause, but equal protection rights are guaranteed by the open
courts constitutional provision 8 4 and the constitutional provision
prohibiting special laws. 18 5 Additionally, the concepts of equal pro-
tection and substantive due process are inherent in the due process
clause 186 of the West Virginia Constitution. 8 7 Whether a constitu-
tional challenge would prevail under these guarantees depends largely
upon the standard of review utilized by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in analyzing the statutory provision.
The standards of judicial review utilized by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals are set out in Cimino v. Board of Ed-
ucation,'88 in which the court stated that:
Whether a statute or governmental action violates the Equal Protection Clause
is a determination made by the application of one of two constitutional tests.
The more demanding test relates to statutes which impinge upon sensitive and
fundamental rights and constitutional freedoms such as religion and speech. In
order to uphold such a statute a reviewing court must find that a compelling state
interest is served by the classification.
In all other instances the unconstitutionality of a statute, challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause, is subject to the traditional standard requiring that the
state law be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.
Under this test, the court must consider whether the classification is a rational
one based on social, economic, historic or geographic factors; whether the clas-
sification bears a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose; and
whether all persons within the classes established are treated equally.' s9
In accordance with those standards, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in Peters v. Narick'90 reviewed cases which held
that classifications based upon race, alienage, national origin, and
183. Id.
184. W. VA. CoNsT. art. 3, § 17.
185. W. VA. CONST. art, 6, § 39.
186. W. VA. CONST. art. 3 § 10.
187. State ex. rel Harris v. Calendine, 160 V. Va. 172, 179, 233 S.E.2d 318, 324 (1977).
188. Cimino v. Board of Educ., 158 W. Va. 267, 210 S.E.2d 485 (1984).
189. Id. at 274, 210 S.E.2d at 490.
190. Peters v. Narick, 165 W. Va. 622, 270 S.E.2d 760 (1980).
19891
21
Oliverio: To Cap or Not to Cap Damage Awards: That is the Constitutional Qu
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
poverty are suspect. Such classifications mandated the application
of a compelling interest or strict scrutiny test. The court enunciated
certain criteria which are indicative of the suspect classification. 9'
"Classifications based upon a characteristic that is permanent, im-
mutable, or a condition of birth have been held to be suspect. Like-
wise, a history of past discrimination and political powerlessness is
significant evidence of suspectness." 192
Medical malpractice tort victims do not possess as a class a per-
manent or immutable characteristic, nor have they historically ex-
perienced discrimination. Thus, it is clear that the capping statute
in question does not create a suspect classification. However, in the
absence of a suspect classification, a statute may still be subject to
strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis if it infringes upon a
fundamental right.
A full recovery in tort is not a right which is guaranteed by the
federal constitution. 93 Although certain state constitutions specifi-
cally prohibit limitations upon recovery in personal injury actions, 94
the West Virginia constitution, like the Virginia constitution, 95 does
not contain such a provision. Moreover, as the Boyd court reasoned
that the right to a full recovery in tort is not a fundamental right
under the Virginia constitution,' 96 it is likely that the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals would make a similar ruling under West
Virginia law. Thus, since W. Va. Code § 55-7B-8 neither creates a
suspect classification, nor infringes upon a fundamental right, it
would be inappropriate to subject it to a strict standard of judicial
review.
It is possible that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
would review the statute under some type of heightened or middle-
tier scrutiny. However, this may be unlikely because the court thus
far has declined to adopt a middle level of judicial review, even in
191. Id. at 631, 270 S.E.2d at 765.
192. Id.
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cases where the United States Supreme Court has done so. 197 Ad-
ditionally, it is important to note that in those cases involving gender
based classifications and classifications based on illegitimacy, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals afforded those who were
detrimentally affected more protection than the federal constitution
guaranteed by requiring that the statutes be subjected to the strictest
possible judicial scrutiny. 198 However, the court's reasoning for ap-
plying a higher standard of review than that accorded by the United
States Supreme Court would seem not to be applicable in the present
situation where a statutory cap on medical malpractice noneconomic
damages is involved. This stems from the fact that classifications
based on gender are regarded as suspect because gender is biolog-
ically permanent' 99 and is an easily recognizable characteristic which,
like race, can carry with it a stigma of inferiority.20 This is ex-
emplified by the fact that women have historically been the victims
of discrimination. 20 1 Likewise, the court has held that a status of
illegitimacy satisfies the stated criteria202 because illegitimates acquire
their label as a condition of birth and have in the past faced pro-
found political and legal disabilities. 203 Therefore, because victims
of medical malpractice possess none of these characteristics, it is
probable that the West Virginia Court of Appeals would adhere to
its two-tier constitutional inquiry and not afford the capping statute
a middle-tier level of judicial review.
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is likely that the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals would find that the rational basis
test is the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be applied when
reviewing the capping statute. The provision may be considered an
economic regulation, and thus the court would subject it to the
liberal standard of review normally accorded to such regulations
under equal protection analysis. This standard involves the deter-
197. See Peters, 165 W. Va. at 630, 270 S.E.2d at 754.
198. See Peters, 165 W. Va. at 634, 270 S.E.2d at 766; Adkins v. McEldowney, 167 W. Va.
469, 472, 280 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1981).
199. Peters, 165 W. Va. at 631, 270 S.E.2d at 763.
200. Id. at 631, 632, 270 S.E.2d at 764.
201. Id. at 632, 270 S.E.2d at 764.
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mination of whether the classification is a rational one and whether
it bears a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental pur-
pose.2
Thus, in order to review the capping statute under the rational
basis test, it would be necessary for the court to examine the Leg-
islature's purpose in enacting it. The Legislature has declared:
That it is the duty and responsibility of the Legislature to balance the right of
our individual citizens to adequate and reasonable compensation with the broad
public interest in the provision of services by qualified health care providers who
can themselves obtain the protection of reasonably priced and extensive liability
coverage;
That in recent years, the cost of insurance coverage has risen dramatically while
the nature and extent of coverage has diminished, leaving the health care providers
and the injured without the full benefit of professional liability insurance cov-
erage. 210
It therefore appears that the legislative goal behind the capping
provision is to secure the provision of health care services by main-
taining the availability of malpractice insurance at affordable rates.
This would clearly be found to constitute a legitimate goal. Addi-
tionally, it seems clear that the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals would find that the medical malpractice cap is a rational
means of achieving that goal and thus would uphold the statute
under an equal protection challenge.
Similarly, the provision is likely to survive a due process chal-
lenge given that the same level of scrutiny is applied both when a
statutory classification is challenged as a violation of due process
and when it is challenged as a violation of equal protection. 2 6 The
court has held that in matters of economic legislation the legislature
must be accorded deference, particularly when a due process stan-
dard is applied. 2 7 However, legislation in economic areas may be
invalidated on due process grounds if the "challenged legislation
bears no rational relationship to the public health, safety, morals,
204. See Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 328 S.E.2d 144, 154
(W. Va. 1984).
205. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-1 (Supp. 1988).
206. Thomas v. Rutledge, 167 W. Va. 487, 494, 280 S.E.2d 123, 128 (1981).
207. Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co., 328 S.E.2d at 149.
[Vol. 91
24
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/11
CAPPING DAMA GE A WARDS
and general welfare of this State or where the statute impinges on
some fundamental or constitutional right. 2 08 As noted under the
preceding equal protection discussion, no fundamental or consti-
tutional right is at stake with the capping statute. Furthermore, it
is highly probable that the statute would be held rationally related
to the public health, safety, and welfare of West Virginia citizens.
Thus, a due process challenge to the statutory provision is unlikely
to be successful.
B. The Right To A Jury Trial Challenge In West Virginia
An additional challenge to the capping statute that could be as-
serted is that W. Va. Code § 55-7B-8 interferes with the plaintiff's
right to a jury trial. Since the seventh amendment's right to trial
by jury in the federal courts has not been extended to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, 20 9 it is necessary to examine the
analogous provision found in the West Virginia Constitution.
Article III, section 13 of the West Virginia Constitution,210 pro-
vides for an absolute right to trial by jury when the matter in con-
troversy exceeds twenty dollars, provided that the right is expressly
asserted.21 The court has held that the language of the provision is
mandatory and the right to trial by jury is fundamental.1
In a case where a plaintiff's noneconomic damages in a medical
malpractice case may be limited by the statute, the plaintiff is af-
forded a right to a jury trial to determine issues of liability as well
as damages. The question is whether the right to a jury trial provided
by the West Virginia Constitution is violated when the jury's as-
sessment of noneconomic damages is limited.
The statutory capping provision in question makes it discretion-
ary whether the jury will be instructed that there is a statutory cap
of $1,000,000 on noneconomic damages. 213 Thus, one of two possible
208. Id.
209. Letendre v. Fugate, 701 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 837 (1983).
210. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 13.
211. Matheny v. Greider, 115 W. Va. 763, 177 S.E. 769 (1934).
212. Stephenson v. Ashburn, 137 W. Va. 141, 145, 70 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1952).
213. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (Supp. 1988).
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scenarios may arise during the course of a medical malpractice pro-
ceeding. First, the jury may receive an instruction concerning the
limitation, which would preclude it from returning a verdict in excess
of the cap. Alternatively, the jury may receive no such instruction
and thus be permitted to determine an unlimited monetary figure
for noneconomic damages. The court would then ignore any amount
exceeding the statutory cap. The jury's role in West Virginia is to
determine genuine issues of fact and a determination of damages is
a genuine issue of fact.2 14 Thus, either of these methods may be
found to infringe upon the jury's fact-finding function in assessing
appropriate damages.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that "[iln
an action for personal injuries the damages are unliquidated or in-
determinate in character and the assessment of such damages is the
peculiar and exclusive province of the jury.' '215 Regarding nonecon-
omic damages, the court has stated that:
There is no exact formula or standard for placing a money value on such matters
as pain, suffering, and mental anguish resulting from personal injuries or em-
barrassment resulting from bodily disfigurement or scars. The law recognizes that
the aggregate judgment of twelve duly selected and properly qualified jurors rep-
resents the best method yet devised for fixing the amount of just compensation
to the injured plaintiff's in such cases.216
Although $1,000,000 may generally be considered just compen-
sation for noneconomic damages in a medical malpractice case, the
determination of what amount is just must be ascertained on a case-
by-case basis by the triers of fact. Therefore, it would be difficult
to find that an injured plaintiff whose noneconomic loss a jury
determines to be $2,000,000 would be justly compensated if that
amount was artificially limited to $1,000,000.
Alternatively, the statutory cap may in certain circumstances al-
low a plaintiff to be unjustly compensated by receiving an award
in excess of what he or she might have been awarded had there
been no statutory cap in existence. It is plausible that a jury could
214. McElwain v. Wells, 369 S.E.2d 230, 231 (W. Va. 1988).
215. Campbell v. Campbell, 146 W. Va. 1002, 1012, 124 S.E.2d 345, 352 (1962).
216. Sargent v. Malcomb, 150 W. Va. 393, 400, 146 S.E.2d 561, 566 (1955).
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be informed of the statutory cap and be subconsciously persuaded
to enter a judgment meeting that cap. However, if there had been
no such limitation, one may suspect that the noneconomic award
might have been substantially less. In this situation, an award which
far exceeds the victim's noneconomic loss may be as unjust as a
deficient award.
Regarding the merits of a right to jury trial challenge, an attorney
general's opinion2 7 written in response to a question posed by the
president of the West Virginia Senate may be persuasive. The opin-
ion states that "[a] proposed 'no-fault' insurance plan which would
limit or prohibit recovery of damages for pain and suffering . . .
would be unconstitutional as violative of Article III, Section 13 of
the Constitution of West Virginia, as denying the right to have a
jury assess the damages, this being part and parcel with the right
to a trial by jury. '218
Additionally, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals may
be persuaded by the argument recently made by the Kansas Supreme
Court. That court indicated that the challenged capping provision
was a statutory compulsory and pre-established remittitur which is
contrary to the general rule.2 9 The rule concerning remittitur in West
Virginia is that the remedy for an excessive verdict is to set it aside
and award a new trial, or give the successful party the option to
release the excess or submit to a new trial.220 Thus, such a statute
may be viewed as forcing the plaintiff to forego part of the jury
award without his or her consent.
It is important to note that one member of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has disclosed his view on the constitu-
tionality of statutes which cap pain-and-suffering awards under a
right to jury trial challenge. Dissenting from the majority in Roberts
v. Stevens Clinic Hospital, Inc.,221 Justice McHugh stated that while
217. 55 Op. Att'y Gen. 82 (1973).
218. Id. at 87.
219. See supra, notes 175, 176 and accompanying text.
220. Browder, Inc. v. County Court of Webster County, 145 W. Va. 695, 702, 116 S.E.2d 867,
871 (1960).
221. Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hosp., Inc., 345 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1986).
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he did not wish to extend his dissenting opinion with a discussion
of whether there is a need for "tort reform," such as "ceilings"
on pain-and-suffering awards, such ceilings
would not run afoul of the second sentence of W. Va. Const. art. III, § 13,
because the ceilings would not constitute a legislative "reexamination" of facts
(amount of damages) found by a jury but would merely place a limit in advance
on the amount of damages to be found by the jury. There would be no substitution
of opinion on the amount of damages.
I express no opinion here on whether ceilings on pain-and-suffering awards in
common law tort cases would violate the first sentence of W. Va. Const. art.
III, § 13 or any other state constitutional provision.22
The second sentence in the constitutional provision provides that
"[n]o fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any case
than according to rule of court or law. ' 223 Justice McHugh stated
that the cap would merely place a limit in advance on the amount
of damages to be found by the jury and thus would not constitute
a reexamination of facts.
When examining the capping statute in question, however, it ap-
pears that whether the jury will be instructed about the liability cap
on noneconomic damages is a discretionary matter. Thus, the jury
may not be so instructed and may return a verdict in excess of the
cap. The court would then reduce the verdict to the statutory limit.
This would appear to constitute a legislative reexamination of the
amount of damages.
On the other hand, even if the jury is informed of the cap prior
to assessing noneconomic damages, the cap will be an interference
with the ultimate determination of facts by the jury. The cap may
not be deemed a reexamination of the facts, only because the jury
will not be permitted to return its actual determination if that de-
termination exceeds the cap. Thus, a reexamination of the complete
facts would not even be possible. However, even if it is arguable
that the precise wording of the second sentence of the right to a
jury trial provision may not be violated by the statutory cap, the
222. Id. at 811 n.15.
223. The dissent was written prior to Boyd, 872 F. Supp. 915, and Kansas Malpractice Victims
Coalition v. Bell, 234 Kan. 333, 757 P.2d 251 (1985).
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cases interpreting the entire provision may persuade the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals to reason otherwise.2 4
C. The Open Courts Challenge In West Virginia
It is unclear if a challenge to the statutory cap under the open
courts provision 22 of the West Virginia Constitution would be suc-
cessful. Although as previously discussed this provision guarantees
equal protection, this section will address the provision's guarantee
of access to the courts.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has stated that,
if a physician commits malpractice, there is little doubt that the
injured individual has the ability to exercise his rights under the
State constitution and seek damages in a court of law.22 6 Thus, one
might argue in defense of the statute that the plaintiff seeking dam-
ages in a medical malpractice action is not being denied access to,
the courts, even though those damages may be limited. However,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals may find this argument
unconvincing as did the Florida Supreme Court in Smith.22 7 The
court in Smith held that access to the courts is granted for the
purpose of redressing injuries and, when a plaintiff receives a jury
award, he has not received a constitutional redress of injuries if the
legislature statutorily caps the recovery at a significantly lower mon-
etary amount. 228
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was faced with a
constitutional challenge under the open courts provision in Wallace
v. Wallace.22 9 Prior to that case, the common law actions for breach
of a promise to marry and alienation of affection were statutorily
abolished.230 The court held that there was no merit in the plaintiff's
contention that the statute which abolished the action violated the
224. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 17.
225. W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 13.
226. McCrossin, Inc. v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 355 S.E.2d 32, 35 (V. Va. 1987).
227. Smith, 507 So. 2d 1080.
228. Id. at 1088.
229. Wallace v. Wallace, 155 W. Va. 569, 184 S.E.2d 327 (1971).
230. W. VA. CODE § 56-3-2a (Supp. 1975).
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open courts provision of the West Virginia constitution. That con-
stitutional provision was held as not applicable to apply to an action
for alienation of affections or breach of a promise to marry because
such action did not affect or relate to an injury to any person in
his "person, property, or reputation." 231
Unlike the factual situation in Wallace, medical malpractice does
result in an injury to the person, and thus the open courts provision
of the West Virginia Constitution would appear to apply. The court
has held that "[o]ur constitution clearly contemplates that every per-
son who is damaged in his person, property, or reputation shall
have recourse to the courts to seek the redress of his injuries. "232
Thus, the question becomes whether one is entitled to "full" redress
of his or her injuries, as determined by a jury.
At common law, a plaintiff injured by medical malpractice could
maintain a cause of action and seek a damage award that was not
limited in any way. Thus, the capping statute takes away from the
plaintiff his or her common law right to receive any award for non-
economic loss which exceeds the statutory cap. Analogously, the
worker's compensation law takes from an employee his common
law right to sue his employer for damages for negligence. However,
in return for this loss the employee receives payment from a fund
of limited or scheduled benefits for disability or death resulting from
the employment relationship, regardless of any fault of the em-
ployer.2 3 Thus, the employee is provided with a reasonable alter-
native to protect his or her rights to redress for injuries.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not explicitly
stated that such a quid pro quo is always necessary whenever the
Legislature alters the common law. However, the court may reason
that it is necessary to determine, as the Smith and Lucas courts did
in their access to courts analyses, whether an alternative remedy is
available to the injured plaintiffs which would satisfy the state con-
stitutional open courts provision.
231. Wallace, 155 W. Va. at 579, 184 S.E.2d at 333.
232. McCrossin, 355 S.E.2d at 32.
233. Belcher v. Richardson, 317 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D. W. Va. 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
404 U.S. 78 (1981).
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III. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the states disagree regarding the constitutionality
of medical malpractice damage limitations. However, it is equally
evident that the recent trend has led to the invalidation of such
provisions.
The enactments that have been found unconstitutional have not
been uniform as to the type of damages that are limited. Statutes
capping economic damages as well as statutes capping noneconomic
damages alone have failed to successfully overcome constitutional
challenges.
While it appears that there is a trend toward invalidating such
statutes, the fact remains that the United States Supreme Court has
refused to render any decision in this area. Until it does so, the
disparity in state court decisions is likely to continue. Thus, for states
considering whether "to cap or not to cap," the constitutional ques-
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